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Abstract
This research examines the extent to which the rationalization tactics model reflects the
relation between magnitude of corruption and attitudes toward corruption. The rationalization
model predicts that individuals will justify their corrupt acts and that rationalizations will
affect subsequent offense depending upon the levels of internal control quality. Using a 2 X 2
between-subjects experiment with 170 public servants as participants, this research finds that
individuals are more prone to accept and rationalize their corrupt acts in the gratuities context
than in the bribery context. Further, this research finds that rationalizations lead to subsequent
offense. However, this study cannot find support on the mitigating effect of internal control
quality. The results point to the importance of considering the implications of organizational
culture for future effective combat against corruption.
Keywords: Corruption, Rationalization, Internal Control
Abstrak
Penelitian ini menguji sejauh mana model taktik rasionalisasi (the rationalization tactics
model) menggambarkan hubungan antara besarnya korupsi dan sikap terhadap korupsi. Model
rasionalisasi (the rationalization model) memprediksi bahwa individu akan membenarkan
tindakan korup mereka dan bahwa rasionalisasi akan memengaruhi pelanggaran selanjutnya
tergantung pada tingkat kualitas kontrol internal. Dengan menggunakan 2X2 eksperimen
between-subjects dengan 170 pegawai negeri sebagai partisipan, penelitian ini menemukan
bahwa individu lebih rentan untuk menerima dan merasionalisasi tindakan korup mereka dalam
konteks gratifikasi daripada dalam konteks suap. Lebih lanjut, penelitian ini menemukan
bahwa rasionalisasi mengarah pada pelanggaran selanjutnya. Namun, penelitian ini tidak dapat
menemukan dukungan pada efek mitigasi kualitas kontrol internal. Hasil ini menunjukkan
pentingnya mempertimbangkan implikasi budaya organisasi untuk pertempuran yang efektif
melawan korupsi di masa depan.
Kata kunci: Korupsi, Rasionalisasi, Pengendalian Internal
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INTRODUCTION
Indonesia is still in a state of highlevel corruption. Of the 168 countries
reviewed, Indonesia ranks 88th in the
corruption perception index (Transparency
International 2016). Various efforts have
been made to eradicate corruption. The
Corruption Eradication Commission has
successfully completed a large number of
high-profile corruption cases. In 2015, the
Commission had conducted 183 investigations and 91 prosecutions (KPK 2016).
In the same year, 33 court decisions had
been taken and Rp198 billions had been
saved and returned to the state treasury.
Nevertheless, the anticorruption agenda is
still far from ideal.
The typical definition of corruption
encompasses the misuse or abuse of the
office (whether public or corporate) for the
sake of private self-interest (Fleming and
Zyglidopoulos 2009). Corruption has
become the cause of a number of acute
problems, such as low economic growth
(Mauro 1995), competitiveness decline and
inflated business costs (Mistry 2012), and
threat to investment climate (Kurtzman et
al. 2004). Olken and Pande (2013) assert
that corruption may increase the marginal
tax rate of firms, significantly lower the
quality of public service, induce inefficiencies, and lessens government’s ability to
correct an externality which can lead to
obstructed law enforcement. Research in
economics and political science provides
explanation upon why a number of
countries fall into category of high
prevalence of corruption while other
countries tend to be free from the problem
(Wang 2014). Prior research investigates
determinants and impacts of corruption.
The main issue that the literature discusses
is exogenous factors affecting corruption,
which in general are beyond government's
control (Liu and Feng 2015).
Meanwhile, research on corruption
has sparked discussion regarding human
factors. Body of literature has given insights on an aggregate level, but still lacks

of resolution on micro level. Few research
highlights causes, consequences, and other
variables pertaining to corruption at the
individual level with relevant organizational contexts. In various cases, corrupttion is usually the result of an agreement or
consent of others. This white collar crime
could take place in a long time and even is
passed throughout generations in organizations. In most instances, the corrupt acts
involves honorable community members
(such as ministers, judges, and politicians).
Hence, the issue about why one is willing to
act in an unethical conduct is still an
important research focus. An essential
question has surfaced concerning the
reasons that lead otherwise law-abiding
individuals to be involved in corrupt
practices.
Corruption, once entrenched, is
difficult to eliminate. Although progress in
combating corruption and unethical
conduct are generally appreciated by
public, corruption and unethical conduct
still remains a serious problem requiring
major efforts. Therefore, it is interesting to
know about the economic, political as well
as psychological factors underlying the
persistence of corruption. Why individuals
commit subsequent offenses or repeated
wrongdoings becomes a fundamental
question. Understanding basic notion causing subsequent offense can serve as an
enabler in effective strategy implementation necessary to reduce corruption which
remains prevalent in many areas.
Combating corruption and unethical
conducts has to be supported with “cultural
and psychological strategies” as well as
legal administrative strategies. Rusch
(2016) suggests that subsequent offense of
corruption may result from the culture of
compliance. An malfunctioning organizational culture may produce individuals’
faulty mental shortcuts and furthers law
violation. Other people who witness the
offense tend not to speak up or act in
response to the situation if they perceive
that no one else witnessing that situation is
speaking up or acting (Latané and Darley
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1970). People can assume that others either
are responsible for taking action or would
do so if they thought it necessary, leading to
an unintended diffusion of responsibility
within the group and a failure by any group
member to take action. This can lead to
even further misconducts.
Corruption is a complex phenomenon
and usually involves more than just greedy
individuals (Fleming and Zyglidopoulos
2009). Ashforth et al. (2008) assert that
corruption can be attributed to personal
greed, organizational culture, or sometimes
is simply difficult to understand. Research
finds that individual’s characteristics influence his fraudulent acts (Hartmann and
Maas 2010; Haines and Leonard 2007; Ford
and Richardson 1994). Systemic corruption
may also be result of moral behaviors that
have developed as schema response mechanism to society social roles (Ntayi et al.
2013).
Anand et al. (2004) provide another
perspective to explain the stimuli that form
wrongdoers’ ethical logic. Their concept of
rationalization explains why one can engage in corruption and at the same time
holds a positive image of himself. Rationalizations are mental strategies that allow
individuals to view their corrupt acts as
justified (Anand et al. 2004). Rationalizations allow actors to alleviate moral
anxiety and to neutralize any regrets or
negative feelings that stem from their participation in unethical acts. Thus, rationalization works as a defense mechanism that
protects the ego from challenges by a
punitive
superego
(Fleming
and
Zyglidopoulos 2009). The power of
rationalization extends from simple and
ordinary wrongdoings to serious forms of
whitecollar crimes.
We extend earlier studies on
corruption by examining the effects of
rationalization on subsequent offense. We
specifically turn our attention to subsequent
offense since it may lead to systemic and
endemic corruption which eventually originate a great deal of loss. Corruption
happens when a person is able to act
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willfully with the intent to disregard or
disobey the law. Repeated corruption can
create shift of mentality and once such
“supplementary incomes” start pouring in,
the habit is difficult to stop.
We propose and find that magnitude
of corruption affects how individual
provides rationalization. Indonesia law
recognizes seven categories of corruption,
from gratuities to bribery, which carry
different severity of punishment. Gratuities
and bribery are the most common methods
of corruption in Indonesia (KPK 2016). We
investigate the effect of these two
magnitudes of corruption since they have
different consequences. We expect and find
that individuals provide more rationalizations when they are involved in
gratuities than when they are involved in
bribery. Our results suggest that involvement in less serious corruption would be
more difficult to fight since perpetrators
were more likely to create resistance.
Literature on fraud (e.g. Barra 2010;
Rae and Subramaniam 2008) asserts that an
effective internal control system is a major
resource for preventing, detecting, and
correcting fraud. Barra (2010) investigates
the relationship between the type of control
and penalty and efforts to reduce fraud. He
finds that separation of functions within the
organizations improves employee's cost of
committing fraud. This means that separation of functions plays an important role in
fraud prevention. Nevertheless, results of
these studies have not been specifically
addressed the role of internal control in
lessening subsequent offense.
Near and Miceli (1995) present a
whistleblowing model and argue that favorable organizational climate to facilitate
whistle blowing actions is necessary for
preventing fraud and other unethical
conducts. Kaplan et al. (2015) investigate
the role of investment in whistle-blowing
development and its relevant managerial
training. Unfortunately, the study could not
provide empirical evidence for the role of
such investment due to low power of test.
We extend the research of Kaplan et al.
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(2015) in an effort to present a more
comprehensive explanation pertaining to
corrup-tion and its prevention means. We
hypothesize that internal control quality
miti-gates the effect of rationalization on
sub-sequent offense. However, the data do
not support the hypothesis.
Overall, our study contributes to the
corruption literature in at least two ways.
The primary contribution is an understanding of how rationalization process increases people’ tendency to engage in
corrupt behavior. Specifically, our research
suggests that different magnitude of corruption carries different cognitive processes.
Our findings indicate that they are also
affected by individuals’ personal definition
regarding corruption. Our research, thus,
sheds some light on some of the less obvious factors that are involved in
corruption.
Second, we provide initial tests of
Anand et al. (2004) proposed rationalization model using a laboratory experiment. Prior research on corruption has been
conducted using experiment (see e.g. Olken
2007; Alatas et al. 2009; Rivas 2012). This
method produces a more convincing causal
relationship compared to other methods.
Survey methods may not be able to deliver
reliable data on corruption activities due to
confidentiality reason. In addition, prior
research on corruption could not extract
strong causal relationship between corruption eradication strategy and corruption
reduction (Peishakin and Pinto 2010). Our
experiment differs from surveys and perception indices in that our experiment
participants receive actual monetary payments, the amounts of which depend on the
decisions they make during the experiments. Hence, through experiment we are
able to reveal mechanics that can explain
why people engage in corrupt acts.
This paper proceeds as follows. In the
next section, we introduce the constructs,
which are central to our analysis, and we
develop our hypotheses. In the third
section, we present the design of the
experiment. The results of the study are

presented in the fourth section. In the fifth
section, we discuss our findings and their
relevance for future research and for
business practice.
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Magnitude of Corruption
Corruption refers to a concept that is
not easy to define. A broad definition of
corruption includes the misuse or abuse of
the office with special focus on the
improper use of the public good by private
self interest (Bratsis 2003; Fleming and
Zyglidopoulos 2009), where misuse in turn
refers to departures from acceptable
societal norms (Anand et al. 2004). Public
office can be misused by receiving and
offering bribes, embezzlement, extortion,
private appropriation and fraudulent use of
funds, nepotism, patronage, or theft of state
assets. Other scholars use the word corruption as “incidents where a bureaucrat (or an
elected official) breaks a rule for private
gain” (Olken & Pande 2013). All of the
above-mentioned definitions are wellmatched to that of Indonesia law. Indonesia
Anticorruption Law recognizes seven
groups of corruption that encompass all
illegal acts to create private gain at the
expense of public or state interest. In this
study, we specifically investigate two
recognized corruption forms that have the
most frequent incidences: gratuities and
bribery.
We refer the magnitude of corruption
to the significance level of corruption.
Thus, magnitude covers not only the size,
but also the intensity of corruption. In this
study, we classify gratuities as an act of
corruption which has a lower magnitude
than bribery. Indonesia anticorruption law
recognizes the difference magnitude of the
two types of corruption. Bribery is the more
serious offense of the two, and conviction
carries penalties of up to life imprisonment
and a maximum fine of Rp1 billion. Illegal
gratuity, by contrast, carries a penalty of up
to three years' imprisonment and a maximum fine of Rp50 millions (KPK 2016).
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Commonly, the public has a negative
view on corruption. Nevertheless, perceptions regarding corruption can be
influenced heavily by cultural bias and vary
across countries (Paldam 2002). People in
some countries regard corruption as a
serious crime and unethical activity while
other individuals have higher tolerance and
even treat corruption as a part of life.
Several research studies across
disciplines have suggested that individuals
and groups are influenced in their behavior
by social norms or culture. Cameron et al.
(2009) examine the effect of cultural
differences on tolerance of corruption.
They conducted experiments in four
countries: Australia, India, Indonesia, and
Singapore by administering two treatments:
welfare reducing corruption or welfare
enhancing corruption. They find significant
cross-country differences. The results from
India and Australia suggest that greater
exposure to corruption in daily life may
build a greater tolerance of corruption.
Indians, as compared to Australians, have a
lower propensity to punish and are more
willing to accept bribes. Alatas et al. (2009)
examine gender differences in behavior
when confronted with a common bribery
problem in four countries: Australia, India,
Singapore, and Indonesia. They specifically
investigate whether women are less likely
to offer bribes and more likely to punish
corrupt behavior. The results show that
Australian men are more likely to engage in
and be more tolerant of corruption than are
Australian women. However, they do not
find significant gender differences in India,
Singapore, and Indonesia. Indonesia
Central Statistics Agency surveyed 10,000
households to measure perceptions of
corruption especially in public services at
the lowest level of government bureaucracy, such as the police and teachers. The
survey reveals that 32% of people polled
viewed bribing police officers as normal,
while 33% of respondents considered it
normal to give extra money to civil registry
officials (Ismar and Husna 2013). Fisman
and Miguel (2007), using a field experiment
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design and diplomats as subjects, investigate whether people from different
cultural backgrounds have different propensities for corrupt acts. They find that
when there is no penalty for breaking the
law, diplomats follow the behavior norms
of government officials in their own
countries, suggesting that penalty enforcement can control individual corruption.
The previous research renders a
baseline for hypothesizing that the
bureaucrats in Indonesia have different
levels of tolerance on corruption, depending on the magnitude of the corrupt acts.
Public perception of corruption may be
related to cultural practices or traditions. In
Indonesia, since forty percent of the
population is Javanese, and that Javanese
people have majority control in the government, Javanese culture is often blamed for
the practices of corruption (Magnis and
Suseno 1984). Javanese people may tend to
tolerate corrupt practices rather than
creating conflicts with the perpetrators by
reporting the illegal acts. It is generally
considered a good-natured prosocial thing
to give and receive gifts, but bribing is
considered to be antisocial and negative.
Hence, if a citizen wants to provide gifts as
a token of appreciation to public servants,
many people tend to agree to such action.
However, research shows that there’s
actually a fine line between the socially
acceptable gratuities and the immoral act of
bribing (Torfason et al. 2012).
Porter (2012) argues that cultures
have widely become less ethical. He finds
that 75 percent of Americans believe that
corruption has increased over three yearperiod (2008-2011), while 62 percent of
Americans believe corruption to be widespread across corporate America. Recent
research also shows the existence of
‘‘unethical pro organization behavior’’
(Vadera and Pratt 2013). Umphress and
Bingham (2011) provide evidence that
individuals may conduct unethical proorganizational behavior because they
strongly identify with the organization or
because of an expectation of reciprocity
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from the organization. So, even when an
organization’s top management believes an
ethical or values-based atmosphere, this
perception may not be shared elsewhere
within the organization. These facts likely
encourage wrongdoing behavior in subtle
ways that are not easily observable. Formal
policies may state an expectation of ethical
behavior but informally encourage different
behaviors.
Extant literature on whistleblowing
research indicates that individuals will react
differently depending on the type of
wrongdoings (Near and Miceli 1995;
Gundlach et al. 2003; Kaplan et al. 2015).
Robinson et al. (2012) argue that people’s
actions are influenced by how they use
information to arrive at causal explanations
for events. If a violation is perceived as
beyond the control of the perpetrator, then
people will tend to be more tolerant to such
offense, and vice versa. According to
Robinson et al. (2012), observers of fraud
are more likely to report misappropriation
of assets than fraudulent financial reporting. Observers will see a person engaging
in misappropriation of assets as having
more responsibility compared to a person
en-gaging in fraudulent financial reporting.
Fraudulent financial reporting is more
attributable to external pressures such as
protecting employees and satisfying equity
holders. The other reason is about who
potentially benefits from the fraud. Misappropriation of assets only benefits the
person engaging in fraud and obviously and
directly harms the firm and its shareholders while fraudulent financial reporting
is seen as potentially benefiting the firm and
its shareholders.
Following the logic, people will tend
to treat small gratituties as a common
practice while bribery as unethical act that
should be avoided. Small gratuities will not
harm anybody as severe as bigger bribery.
Moreover, the practice of accepting and
giving small gratuites is a more common
practice than bigger bribery, as suggested
by the preceeding discussion regarding
culture. Thus, accepting small gratuities

may be seen as more attributable to external
climate and pressures than accepting bigger
bribery. The discussion leads to the following hypothesis.
H1 :

Small gratuities will be more
acceptable than bigger bribery.

Rationalization
Big ambition combined with greed
can be a common answer to the question
about the motivation of criminals. One can
attribute unethical behavior and corrupt acts
to the personal characteristics of individuals. The underlying assumption is that
one is eventually responsible for his own
moral choices, ethical conduct, and subsequent consequences (Trevino and
Youngblood 1990). Other studies suggest
that individuals’ character (Haines and
Leonard 2007), traditional values and
empathy (Hobson et al. 2011), honesty
(Rankin et al. 2008), and level of
Machiavellianism (Hartmann and Maas
2010) as determinants of individuals’
tendency to act illegally or unethically.
However, the previous dispositional
approach fails to recognize the role of
context that may lead individuals to act
unethically if placed in opposed conditions
(Fleming and Zyglidopoulos 2009).
Research finds that social pressure affects
dysfunctional behavior (Hartmann and
Maas 2010) and that effectiveness of a code
of ethics will improve manager behavior to
the extent that it activates social norms that
control opportunistic behavior (Davidson
and Stevens 2013).
According to psychology literature,
rationalization plays an important role in
explaining corruption. Rationalization is a
psychological mechanism that people use to
protect themselves from moral anxiety
caused by their unethical conduct or
behavior. Individuals rationalize to neutralize or at least reduce their feelings of
distress after committing unethical acts.
Rationalization is a form of appeasement to
oneself. Bad actions are justified because,
for example, “others do the same thing” or
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“we have to do to avoid a greater risk”
(Anand et al 2004). The logic is in line with
the theory of cognitive dissonance
(Festinger 1957). The theory explains that a
person’s actions can affect his attitude and
subsequent belief. The main proposition of
the theory is that if a person has two inconsistent cognitions or when the behavior
is not in accordance with his thoughts, then
he will experience psychological dissonance, an uncomfortable condition.
Consequently, he will attempt to reduce this
dissonance. Rationalization is one of the
ways that people can use to reduce
cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance
theory provides the foundation for rationalization. The theory presents answer to
the question of why people are increasingly
trapped in a condition of bounded ethicality
(Fleming and Zyglidopoulos 2008).
Further, Anand et al. (2004) classify
rationalization strategies into several types:
denial of responsibility, denial of injury,
denial of victim, social weighting, appeal to
higher loyalties, and balancing the ledger.
Denial of responsibility can be described as
a condition in which the offender perceives
that he is just one of the perpetrators and
does not assume the main responsibility of
the violation. Denial of injury refers to the
condition in which perpetrators believe that
no damages arising from their actions.
Denial of victim is a rationalization strategy
that puts violated party as the one who
deserves the unethical treatment. Social
weighting is a form of rationalization in
which the perpetrator makes selective
social comparisons. Appeal to higher loyalties is the position assumed offenders as
they argue that their violation of norms is
due to their attempt to realize a higher order
value. Balancing the ledger is the type of
rationalization in which the actors rationalize that they are entitled to do corrupt acts
because of their accrued credits (deed or
sacrifice) in their jobs.
Consistent with the theory of
cognitive dissonance, anxiety and guilt
arising from a corrupt act are closely related
to cognitive dissonance. Consequently, the
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perpetrator will evaluate and rationalize his
actions to reduce the dissonance. In the case
of small gratuities, the perpetrator will use
rationalization that leads to a new cognitive
equilibrium. In a bribery situation, rationalization will not be as easy as that in the case
of the gratuities. The actor will perceive
consequences of bribery outweigh those of
gratuities. In short, it is harder to rationalize
bribery than small gratuities. Thus, the
following hypothesis is formulated.
H2 :

Small gratuities will be easier to
rationalize than bigger bribe.

When a person violates public trust
by committing illegal and unethical acts
such as corruption, he has a possibility to lie
in order to conceal the shame. He can lie by
giving false information (act of
commission) or withhold the true information (act of omission) (Fleming and
Zyglidopoulos 2008). Both types of lie will
be mutually reinforcing. This escalation
process requires rationalization at every
stage. The rationalizaton of repeated
corruption will decrease one’s sensitivity in
assessing moral standards. The person who
experience this condition can justify his
corrupt acts because “everyone does it”. In
whistleblowing literature, rationalization
takes place in explaining why people
behave differently when they are exposed
to different contexts of essentially the same
offense or fraud (Robinson et al. 2012;
Kaplan et
al. 2015). Moreover,
rationalization has become common in
shaping
culture
that
is
more
accommodating to unethical conduct
(Vadera and Pratt 2013). Tenbrunsel and
Messick (2004) suggest that repeated
rationalization will result in distorted moral
reality. Individuals will tend to commit
subsequent offense and they will find that
rationalization gets easier in the future
because of social conformity (DeZoort and
Lord 1997). Corruption which originally
initiated by some people could transform
into a collective norm (Spicer 2009). The
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discussion leads
hypothesis.
H3 :

to

the

following

Rationalization positively affects
repeat offense.

Internal Control Quality
Internal control has two categories:
accounting control and administrative
control (Rodgers et al. 2015). The first
category relates to the safeguarding of an
organization’s assets and the reliability of
accounting information while the latter
deals with efficiency of operations. Internal
control includes a number of elements, such
as fraud risk assessment, separation of
duties, operation policies, and internal
audit. Strong internal control promotes
organizational culture that has the ability to
detect and prevent dysfunctional behaviors.
Research results show the importance of
investment in internal control improvement
(Kaplan et al. 2015). Rodgers et al. (2015)
find that training and education are
effective to change individuals’ behavior
and reduce fraud action. Improving internal
control quality will result in a more
responsible management, skilled employees, as well as reliable systems. Kaplan et
al. (2015) assert that managerial training
can increase management’s sensitivity in
detecting, preventing, and reporting fraud.
Furthermore, they argue that improving
internal control provide signal that an
organization has strong values to oppose
fraud. The signal relates positively with the
efforts of the prevention and reduction of
unethical acts within organizations and
their organizational trust (Seifert et al.
2014).
Fraud Triangle model (Cressy 1953)
suggests that corruption can occur due to
three conditions: pressure to engage in
corrupt acts, opportunity, and rationalization. Pressure can take forms as need to
achieve performance targets, personal satisfaction, or fear of failure (Murphy and Free
2016). Opportunity to commit fraud can be
realized when an organization’s control
system is weak or when organizational

culture and management style supports
corruption (Laxman et al. 2014). Rationalization is associated with one’s willingness
to commit corruption and his ability to shift
responsibility to other parties.
Strong internal control decreases the
opportunity to commit corruption (Rodgers
et al. 2015). Absence of the opportunity will
discourage a person from engaging in
corrupt acts. Internal control can activate
social norms that can control individuals’
opportunistic behavior. Thus, the above
discussion brings expectations of the
mitigating effect of internal control quality.
The expectation can be formulated in the
following hypothesis.
H4 :

Internal control quality moderates the relationship between
rationalization and subsequent
offense; the higher internal
control quality, the weaker the
positive effect of rationalization
on subsequent offense.
RESEARCH METHOD

Research Design
To examine the hypotheses we use a
2 X 2 between-subjects factorial
experiment design. Magnitude of corruption and internal control quality were
manipulated by varying the experimental
case scenarios. We develop an instrument
to measure rationalization based on
rationalization tactics model (Anand et al.
2004). The instrument covers six types of
rationalization tactics. The scale contains
six items and asks participants to what
extent they agree with statements that are
indicative
of
rationalizations.
The
statements are: I do not assume responsibility because giving or receiving gifts is a
common practice (denial of responsibility),
The party that provides the gift does not
suffer losses (denial of injury), I do not ask
for the gift, it is the giver’s idea (denial of
victim), Other people do worse acts (social
weighting), If I turned down the gift, I
would have disturbed social order (appeal
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to higher loyalties), and I deserve the
gift(balancing the ledger). The items were
scored on a five-point Likert scale
(“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”).
Participants
One hundred seventy participants
volunteered to participate in this
experiment. All participants were public
servants working in a large state university
in Indonesia and each had at least 3 years of
full time work experience. The subjects are
selected because of their duties in protecting the interests of the State as civil
servants. They may have different characteristics than other civil servants. However,
it is not the intent of this research to pursue
high external validity. As long as the
subjects provide sufficient ecological validity and, thus, support the endeavor to
achieve high internal validity, they can
serve as justifiable subjects in this research.
Twenty five participants failed
manipulation tests and were later excluded
from the analysis, resulting in 145 usable
responses. Participants included 85 females
and 60 males whose ages ranged from 24 to
58 years old. Participants’ mean age was
40.7 years and mean work experience was
16.1 years. The cell sizes for each of the
four treatment groups varied between 34
and 39. Statistical tests did not reveal any
significant differences in participant responses across there demographic characteristic.
Research Instrumental and Procedures
The subject participated voluntarily
in the experiment during a university
convention. We conducted the experiment
without specifying the exact purpose of the
study to the participants. Participants
received a token of appreciation plus
earnings depending upon their decision in
the experiment. We randomly assigned
participants to treatment conditions. The
participants spent approximately 30
minutes reading and filling out the
instrument questionnaire. The research
instrument was pre-tested in a separate
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group of 30 full time students enrolled in a
Master of Management program, most of
who were working in a management
position. This pilot test confirmed that there
was substantial variance in the dependent
variable and that a significant amount of
this variance could be explained by the
study’s independent variables. Moreover,
the pilot test showed that participants found
the case realistic and interesting.
The research instrument contained a
case scenario that was specially developed
for this study. The scenario describes a
situation in which each participant acts as
the person in charge in an important
procurement process in the university. In
the process, each participant must decide
whether to accept gifts from a supplier. In
the condition of low magnitude of
corruption (i.e. gratuities), each participant
receives an offer to accept a monetary gift
in amount of Rp5 millions after the
completion of the procurement project. In
high magnitude of corruption (i.e. bribery)
condition, each participant is offered a
monetary gift in amount of Rp50 millions
from a supplier to make the procurement
decision in favor of the supplier. In the two
conditions, we asked the participants to
indicate the likelihood that they would
accept the gifts. At this time, we informed
them that they would get an opportunity to
win prize money in amount of Rp1.5
millions should they decided to accept the
gift. Otherwise, they would only get the
token of appreciation. Next, we measured
their rationalization using the instrument
discussed above.
We provide two scenarios for high or
poor internal control quality. In high (low)
internal control quality condition, participants were informed that the university
has (lacks of) clear separation of functions,
(has no) existing competent internal audit
unit, and (has no) whistle-blowing mechanism against fraud. The three characteristic
is based on studies by Near and Miceli
(1995) and Kaplan et al. (2015). Next, we
asked the participants to indicate the
likelihood that they would commit the same
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act in the future. Finally, we administered
an exit questionnaire, debriefed the
participants, and distributed the prize
money.
RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
The manipulation of magnitude of
corruption was checked with the following
post-experimental questionnaire item
scored on a five-point Likert scale: “The gift
was a form of corruption.” The mean score
in the low (high) magnitude conditions was
1.71 (3.42). The difference between the
scores is significant (t = 12.44, p < 0.000).
The manipulation of internal control quality
was checked with the following item scored
on a five-point Likert scale: “The university
has strong internal quality systems.” The
mean score in the low (high) quality
conditions was 1.68 (3.66). This difference
is also significant (t = 19.44, p = 0.000).
Hypothesis Testing
The descriptive statistics for corruption
acceptability,
rationalizations,
and
subsequent offense are summarized in
Table 1, a multivariate model with corruption acceptability and rationalization as the
dependent variables of magnitude of
corruption is presented in Table 2, and a 2
X 2 ANOVA model, with subsequent
offense as the dependent variable, is
presented in Table 3. As can be seen from
Table 1, and consistent with H1, the
average corruption acceptability is higher
for gratuities (6.18) than for bribery (2.36).
This difference, as presented in Table 2, is
statistically significant (F = 5.39, p < 0.05),
thus H1 is supported.
H2 predicts that smaller gratuities is
easier to rationalize than bigger bribe. Table
1 further presents that the average rationalization is higher for gratuities (2.85) than
for bribery (2.46), consistent with H2. The
difference, as presented in Table 2, is statistically significant (F = 5.80, p < 0.05), and
therefore H2 is supported.

H3 examines the positive effect of
rationalization on individuals’ subsequent
offense. The overall ANOVA model as
shown in Table 3 confirms our expectation
(significant main effect for rationalization,
F = 3.34, p = 0.00), and thus H3 is
supported.
Table 3 also shows that internal
control quality affects subsequent offense
(moderately significant, F = 3.71, p = .057).
However, we do not find the moderating
effect of internal control quality as predicted in H4. Table 3 shows that there is insignificant interaction effect of rational-ization
and internal control quality (F = .83, p =
.614), and therefore H4 is not supported.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In this study, we investigate whether
magnitude of corruption affects rationalization and corruption acceptability.
Specifically, we hypothesize that gratuities
are more socially accepted than bribery.
Our data analysis supports the hypothesis.
The finding is consistent with the literature,
especially research that has conjecture that
a violation is perceived as beyond the control of the perpetrator and as a product of
external pressures, then the wrongdoing is
more acceptable than that in control of the
wrongdoers (Robinson et al. 2012; Kaplan
et al. 2015). The study results indicate that
gratuities are considered prosocial but bribery is antisocial. This finding is particulary
is antisocial. This particularly interesting
since generally corruption is considered as
a heinous crime (Cameron et al. 2009). The
results suggest that people are more tolerant
of a particular type of corruption but at the
same time condemn other kinds of
corruption. This implies that the benefits of
gratuities are likely to outweigh the costs of
the corruption. Our study supports the view
that individual attitudes toward corruption
are complicated and contingent on myriad
factors, such as cultural bias (Paldam
2002).
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Table 1
Means (standard deviation) of dependent variables
Magnitude of Corruption
Gratuities
Bribery

Internal Control
Quality

Low

High
Column Total

CA = 6.18 (10.56)
RA = 2.85 (1.10)
SO = 2.32 (0.93)
n = 37
SO = 2.11 (0.85)
n = 35
SO = 2.22 (0.90)
n = 72

CA = 2.36 (9.32)
RA = 2.46 (0.84)
SO = 1.82 (0.95)
n = 34
SO = 1.38 (0.49)
n = 39
SO = 1.59 (0.77)
n = 73

Row Total
SO = 2.08 (0.97)
n = 71
SO = 1.73 (0.78)
n = 74
SO = 1.90 (0.90)
n = 145

CA: Corruption Acceptability; RA: Rationalization; SO: Subsequent Offense

Table 2
Multivariate Model of Corruption Acceptability and Rationalization
Source

DV

Type III Sum of
Squares

df

Mean Square

F

CA
2624.686
1
2624.686
26.286
RA
1018.671
1
1018.671
1058.357
CA
537.789
143
537.789
5.386
MagCor
RA
5.582
143
5.582
5.800
CA
14278.762
145
99.851
Error
RA
137.638
145
.963
CA
17425.000
144
Total
RA
1160.899
144
DV: Dependent Variable; MagCor: Magnitude of Corruption; CA: Corruption Acceptability; RA:
Rationalization

Intercept

We also predict that smaller gratuities
is easier to rationalize than bigger bribe.
The results show that the study subjects are
able to rationalize smaller gratuities easier
than big bribe. The results are in line with
the literature that supports the significant
role of context beyond individuals dispositional factors in explaining why
individuals act unethically if placed in
opposed
conditions
(Fleming
and
Zyglidopoulos 2009; Hartmann and Maas
2010; Davidson and Stevens 2013). Our
study supports the conjecture that rationalization plays an important role in explaining corruption. Our study also provide
evidence for the theory of cognitive
dissonance (Festinger 1957). In a bribery
situation, rationalization becomes more
difficult than in that of gratuities. Our study

Sig.
.000
.000
.022
.017

subjects perceive that consequences of
bribery outweigh those of gratuities.
Next, our hypothesis that rationalization positively affects subsequent offense
is also supported. This result implies that
whenever individuals escalate their unethical conduct, they need to rationalize at
every stage of the escalation process. The
repeated rationalizaton decreases one’s
sensitivity in assessing moral standards
and, thus, results in distorted moral reality
(Kaplan et al. 2015; Vadera and Pratt 2013;
Tenbrunsel and Messick 2004). Individuals
find it easier to commit repeated offense
since “everyone does it”, “the offense does
not harm anybody”, “the wrongdoing is just
a small matter”, or they claim that they
deserve the right to do so.
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Table 3
Test of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent variable: Subsequent Offense

Source
Intercept
RA
ICQ
RA * ICQ
Error
Total

Type III Sum of
Squares
208.034
33.481
2.320
5.687
72.565
642.000

df
1
16
1
11
116
145

Mean Square
208.034
2.093
2.320
.517
.626

F
332.558
3.345
3.708
.826

Sig.
.000
.000
.057
.614

RA: Rationalization; ICQ: Internal Control Quality

Many would suggest that hypocrisy
may be a sound argument; perpetrators of
corruption may preaching virtue while
practicing vice. While extant literature provides explanations from the perspective of
types of people that are prone to corruption
(Trevino and Youngblood 1990), the
current study shed some light on how
contextual factors make people behave in
such a manner. The current study departs
from a more traditional assumption that
brings to the fore the individual and his
deeds, and specifically shows that
rationalization has an important effect on
people attitudes toward corrupt behavior.
When people think that their behavior falls
short of common ethical standards, they
justify the legitimacy of their actions.
Our last hypothesis is the moderating
role of the quality of internal control on the
relationship between rationalization and
subsequent offense in that high quality of
internal control weakens the relationship.
The research fails to find support for such
hypothesis. While internal control quality
can reduce subsequent offense directly, we
cannot find its mitigating effect on
rationalization. Thus, our study does not
provide empirical evidence to support the
conjectures of Kaplan et al. (2015) and
Rodgers et al. (2015).
Research finds that improving internal
control quality by training and education
will result in a more effective system and
reduce fraud action (Rodgers et al. 2015).
High quality of internal control also
provides signal that an organization has
strong values to oppose fraud (Kaplan et al.

2015) and the signal affects positively on
the prevention and reduction of unethical
acts within organizations (Seifert et al.
2014).
However, our research failure to find
support for the hypothesis suggests that
high quality of internal control may not
automatically mitigate individuals intent to
corrupt since it does not carry severe
penalty on the behavior. We also speculate
that the the mitigating effect of internal
control is minimum since individuals
already have strong rationalizations to
justify their behavior. According to the
Fraud Triangle Model (Cressy 1953;
Murphy and Free 2016), corruption can
occur because of pressure to engage in
corrupt acts, opportunity, and rationalization. Strong internal control may
decrease the opportunity to commit corruption (Rodgers et al. 2015; Laxman et al.
2014) but the internal control may fail to
prevent
individuals
from
shifting
responsibility to other parties.
Our
study
has
important
implications for both researchers and
practitioners. Prior research has shown that
individuals will react differently depending
on their types of wrongful acts (e.g.
Robinson et al. 2012; Kaplan et al. 2015).
We extend this line of research by
examining how the differences in attitudes
toward corruption are affected by the
magnitude of the act. Specifically, our
study demonstrates that rationalization
reinforces people to behave in unethical
ways.
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Understanding this driver of
corruption is important, as the fight against
corruption can lead to prolonged and too
costly process without proper and
comprehensive understanding regarding
the issue. To effectively reduce the effect of
rationalization, organizations must provide
opportunities for actors to contemplate and
find the true causes behind a potentially
corruption. Executives should create an
environment where actors are at least
encouraged to do the right thing. Employee
education and the establishment of
independent supervisory body could go a
long way toward avoiding rationalization
tactics.
Our study has a number of limitations
that may encourage future work. First, we
note that our findings’ generalizability is
limited by our use of a single scenario,
along with testing only two factors of
corruption (rationalization and internal
control quality). Additionally, our subjects
were from one large university in
Indonesia. Despite the assumption that the
subjects should have similar practices and
experiences as the other large organizations, differences still do exist among
organizations. More research is required to
determine whether the results of this study
are reproducible, and the limits of their
generality. Second, our study focused on
the implicit theory about causality and its
effect relative to only the two factors. It is
possible that other cultural values or factors
may be more relevant. Future research may
investigate these possible factors. Third, the
present research was conducted in the
context of morality inferences. Whether the
results are generalizable to other inferences
and judgments is unknown. It is important
for the future researcher to consider
whether other contexts can provide more
valid measures of underlying relationships.
We agree with the vast majority of the
ethics and morality research community
that continuing caution should be exercised
down the path we have followed. Another
major limitation of this study is the length
of time subjects were exposed to the
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treatment conditions. In reality, people
working in organizations may have
established relationships from previous
interactions. A useful extension of this
research would be to conduct a similar
study over an extended period of time.
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